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Abstract
Several scholars have recently entertained proposals for “epistocracy,” a political regime
in which decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a society’s most informed
and competent citizens. These proposals rest on the claim that we can expect better political
outcomes if we exclude incompetent citizens from participating in political decisions because
competent voters are more likely to vote “correctly” than incompetent voters. We develop
what we call the objection from selection bias to epistocracy: a procedure that selects voters
on the basis of their observed competence—as epistocracy does—will often be “biased” in
the sense that competent voters will be, on average, more likely than incompetent voters to
possess certain attributes that reduce the probability of voting correctly. Our objection gener-
alizes the “demographic objection” discussed in previous literature, showing that the range of
realistic scenarios in which epistocracy is vulnerable to selection bias is substantially broader
than previous discussions appreciate. Our discussion also shows that previous discussions have
obscured the force of the threat of selection bias. Since we lack reasons to believe that episto-
cratic proposals can avoid selection bias, we have no reason to seriously entertain epistocracy
as a practical proposal.
1 Introduction
Most democratic citizens appear to be ignorant of crucial facts about the political systems in which
they participate, the parties and candidates they vote for, and the policies their leaders enact.1 They
lack the basic knowledge one would need to form reliable judgments about politics. Some scholars
trace democracy’s ills to these well-known facts about “voter incompetence.”2 Echoing Plato’s
critique of democracy and Mill’s arguments for plural voting, some critics go further to entertain
proposals for “epistocracy,” a non-democratic regime in which the demonstrably “incompetent”
are disfranchised or their decision-making power severely curtailed.3
1Predecessors of this paper were presented at the PPE Society Annual Meeting and at a seminar
at New York University; we are grateful to these audiences for productive discussion. For detailed
discussion, we are especially grateful to Dimitri Landa, Ryan Pevnick, and Melissa Schwartzberg.
We also thank two anonymous referees at Philosophy & Public Affairs for helpful suggestions.
2See, e.g., Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, Democracy for Realists (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 2016); Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 2007); Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New
York: Harper, 1942); Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government
is Smarter (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).
3Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Adam F.
Gibbons, “Political Disagreement and Minimal Epistocracy,” Journal of Ethics and Social Phi-
losophy, 19 (2021): 192–201; Thomas Mulligan, “Plural voting for the twenty-first century,” The
Philosophical Quarterly 68 (2018): 286–306. Cf. Garrett Jones, 10% Less Democracy: Why You
Should Trust Elites a Little More and the Masses and Little Less (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2020); Claudio López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement: the Morality of
Electoral Exclusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Finlay Malcolm, “Epistocracy
and Public Interests,” Res Publica (forthcoming), https://philpapers.org/rec/MALEAP-2, accessed
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Arguments for epistocracy are instrumental: they rest on the claim that we can expect better
political decisions—and, in turn, better political outcomes—if we exclude incompetent citizens
from participating in political decisions. As Brennan puts it, “there are [. . . ] good grounds to pre-
sume that some feasible form of epistocracy would in fact outperform democracy.”4 The grounds
for this expectation seem highly intuitive: starting from an ostensible platitude—that a voter can
be expected to make good decisions only if they have certain knowledge and abilities—it seems
a short step to the claim that a decision-making body that excludes incompetent people should
be more likely to make “good” or “correct” decisions than a decision-making body that includes
competent and incompetent alike.
Various objections have been raised against epistocracy. One familiar argument is, in effect,
that the epistocrat’s “short step” commits the fallacy of composition. As epistemic democrats of-
ten point out, groups can have a higher likelihood of producing correct decisions than we might
expect from looking at the average competence of the individual members of the group, owing to
the mechanisms used to aggregate individuals’ contributions to the group’s decision-making pro-
cedure.5 These arguments target the inference from the claim that competent individuals are more
likely to choose correctly than incompetent individuals to the claim that groups largely composed
of competent individuals are more likely to choose correctly than groups composed of both compe-
May 3, 2021.
4Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 16.
5For example, Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann, An Epistemic Theory of Democracy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Col-
lective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
For additional reasons to distinguish between claims about voters and claims about electorates,
which are distinct from those emphasized by epistemic democrats, see Scott Ashworth and An-
thony Fowler, “Electorates versus Voters,” Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
1 (2020): 477–505.
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tent and incompetent individuals. Whatever the merits of these arguments, we focus our attention
elsewhere.6
We develop what we call the objection from selection bias, which generalizes a class of ob-
jections previously discussed as “the demographic objection” to epistocracy.7 As we present it,
this objection targets the claim that competent voters are, on average, more likely to vote correctly
than incompetent voters; or, put differently, that competence is correlated with a higher probability
of voting correctly. In the first instance, epistocrats might infer this claim from the assumption
that a certain kind of competence increases one’s probability of voting correctly. We show that
this inference is faulty because it ignores the realistic possibility that (put roughly for now) the
explanation for why some people acquire competence also implies that competence is positively
correlated with attributes that decrease the probability of voting correctly. Where this possibility
is realized, any procedure that selects voters on the basis of their observed competence will be
“biased” in the sense that competent voters will be, on average, more likely than incompetent vot-
ers to possess certain attributes that reduce the probability of voting correctly. Thus, competent
voters may be less likely to vote correctly than incompetent voters even though competence in-
creases one’s probability of voting correctly. Recognizing this inferential error, epistocrats might
try arguing directly for the claim that competence is correlated with a higher probability of voting
correctly. However, the reasons to expect bias in a procedure for selecting competent voters imply
6We also set aside doubts about whether it is possible to have the kind of knowledge that episto-
crats propose to make a condition for enfranchisement; see, e.g., Paul Gunn, “Against Epistocracy,”
Critical Review 31 (2019): 26–82; Julian Reiss, “Expertise, Agreement, and the Nature of Social
Scientific Facts, or: Against Epistocracy,” Social Epistemology 33 (2019): 183–92.
7Jason Brennan, “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?” Res Publica 24
(2018): 53–71; David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 11; Thomas Mulligan, “On the compatibility of epistoc-
racy and public reason,” Social Theory and Practice 41 (2015): 458–476.
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that any argument for that claim must rest on premises that are, at best, highly speculative and, at
worst, deeply implausible. Without any reasons to accept the claim that competent voters are more
likely to vote correctly than incompetent voters, we have no grounds for expecting that epistocratic
decision procedures will tend to produce better decisions than democracy with universal suffrage.
Previous discussions of the demographic objection have obscured both the scope and the force
of the threat that selection bias poses to arguments for epistocracy. Regarding scope, the range of
realistic scenarios in which epistocratic proposals are threatened by selection bias is substantially
broader than extant discussions appreciate. This is because these discussions have neglected the
broader implications of candidate explanations for the distribution of competence within a popula-
tion.
Previous discussions have also misconstrued the force of the threat of selection bias because
they have assumed the upshot of the demographic objection to be the conclusion that democracy
with universal suffrage is better than epistocracy. As we present it, however, the objection from
selection bias does not provide a reason to endorse universal suffrage. Without a direct measure of
who is voting “correctly,” and absent heroic assumptions about how all the myriad influences on
voting behavior are jointly distributed within a population, there is no way to draw a conclusion
about whether the typical voter in an epistocracy would be more or less likely than the typical
democratic voter to vote correctly. That is the point of our objection. As we see it, then, the
threat of selection bias implies a skeptical claim: namely, that we have no reason to expect that the
average epistocratic voter will be more likely to vote correctly than the average democratic voter.
So far as we can tell, epistocrats have grounded their proposals on little more than this expectation.




The objection from selection bias is directed against epistocratic proposals to restrict voting rights
to citizens who possess some desirable form of competence. Proposals for more complicated forms
of epistocracy, and their potential vulnerability to the objection, are considered in a later section.
To state the objection we need to define some terms.
An epistocratic suffrage rule is an institutional rule that grants voting rights to citizens who
demonstrate knowledge or abilities that, by assumption, increase a voter’s probability of voting
correctly. Call this bundle of knowledge and abilities, whatever it might be, measurable compe-
tence. We leave it to epistocrats to specify this further, whether it be the knowledge measured by
performance on a “voter qualification exam”,8 a university degree,9 or some other kind of knowl-
edge or ability that is empirically measurable and increases the probability of voting “correctly.”
A person votes correctly if they vote for whichever option is best, according to whatever standard
(justice, the common good, etc.) epistocrats propose to use to make the argument that epistocracy
would produce better decisions than democracy.10 An epistocratic electorate is a group of people
who are eligible to vote under an epistocratic suffrage rule, and a democratic electorate is a group
of people who are eligible to vote under a standard rule of universal suffrage.
Those who sympathetically consider epistocratic suffrage rules argue they would produce bet-
ter decisions than universal suffrage. This conclusion seems to be based on the belief that the
average probability of voting correctly among members of an epistocratic electorate is higher than
8For example, Brennan, Against Democracy, pp. 211–12.
9For example, John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 8.
10For the sake of simplicity, we restrict attention to binary political decisions, such as elections
between two candidates or referendums on ballot measures. We also bracket questions about the
agenda-setting process, important as they are.
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the average probability of voting correctly among members of a democratic electorate. This belief
is the focus of our argument: are there any reasons to believe the average epistocratic voter is
more likely to vote correctly than the average democratic voter?
Our question presupposes a concrete and feasible implementation of an epistocratic suffrage
rule. The rule with which we compare universal suffrage must not be defined abstractly as the rule
that enfranchises all and only those citizens who are most likely to vote correctly, or—worse yet—
the rule that maximizes the probability that the electorate makes the best decision. Such suffrage
rules would make the answer to our question trivial. Brennan gives a less extreme but still prob-
lematic description of epistocracy: “a system is epistocratic to the extent that greater knowledge
and the good faith to act on this knowledge are de jure, legal prerequisites for holding power or are
legal grounds for being granted greater power through law.”11 This describes an aspiration rather
than an institution. Knowledge and the good faith to act on it cannot be perfectly observed; at
best, an institutional designer could aspire to design rules that would reliably but imperfectly make
voting rights conditional on knowledge and good faith. These aspirational suffrage rules force us
into an unfair comparison, pitting concrete democratic procedures against epistocratic proposals
that lack any determinate institutional embodiment. Our approach will be, instead, to posit some
feasible test for reliably but imperfectly assessing competence, hold this test fixed, and then com-
pare the probability that the typical democratic voter will vote correctly with the probability that
the typical epistocratic voter will vote correctly.
A second point to make about our question concerns an ambiguity in the comparison it asks
about. To see this, fix a population of citizens, all of whom would be enfranchised under universal
suffrage, and assume that, in actual fact, democratic voting rules with universal suffrage are in
place. Even when passing a competence test is not a condition for voting, some of these citizens
have acquired or will acquire the information or abilities that would, hypothetically, allow them
to pass a competence test were it to be administered. We could compare the average probability
11Brennan, “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?”, p. 54.
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of voting correctly within this group with that of the general population. Alternatively, we could
consider the counterfactual scenario in which the competence test has been instituted and then
compare the average probability of voting correctly for this counterfactual epistocratic electorate
with the average probability of voting correctly for the democratic electorate. The second compar-
ison, but not the first, is sensitive to any possible treatment effects of instituting the exam—some
people who would fail the competence test when actual institutions are democratic might be incen-
tivized to behave differently, and might therefore pass the exam, if the exam were put in place as
a condition for voting. For this reason the second comparison appears more directly relevant to a
comparative assessment of democracy with epistocracy. Hereafter, “epistocratic electorate” refers
to the group of voters who would pass a competence test were one implemented as a condition for
voting, and “epistocratic voter” refers to a member of this group.
Finally, note that our question compares the average epistocratic voter with the average demo-
cratic voter, rather than comparing the epistocratic electorate with the democratic electorate. We
are thereby bracketing familiar questions concerning aggregation that are no doubt relevant to a
comprehensive assessment of democratic and epistocratic voting procedures.12 Epistocrats have
not appealed to any mechanisms of this kind so, given our purposes, it is appropriate to set these
issues aside.
3 The objection from selection bias
The objection from selection bias targets the following
Epistocratic Conjecture: The average epistocratic voter is more likely to vote correctly than the
average democratic voter.
12Cf. Goodin and Spiekermann, An Epistemic Theory of Democracy; Landemore, Democratic
Reason.
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Epistocrats don’t provide empirical evidence for this conjecture. Doing so would require iden-
tifying which option is best (in some particular context) and then comparing the proportions of
competent and incompetent voters who vote for it. Since there is reasonable disagreement about
which options are best in most contexts, epistocrats understandably avoid burdening their argu-
ments with controversial claims along these lines.13
Nor do epistocrats explicitly argue for the conjecture on theoretical grounds. As far as we can
tell, the best reconstruction of epistocrats’ reasoning is something like the following:14
(1) Being measurably competent increases a person’s probability of voting correctly.
(2) Thus measurably competent citizens are more likely to vote correctly than measurably in-
competent citizens.
(3) An epistocratic electorate has a greater proportion of measurably competent voters than a
democratic electorate.
(4) Thus the average epistocratic voter is more likely to vote correctly than the average demo-
cratic voter.
The first premise is true by our definition of “measurable competence”. The third premise is almost
trivially true: all members of an epistocratic electorate have measurable competence, by definition,
and it is unlikely that all members of a democratic electorate would. The critical step is the move
from (1) to (2), which we show is a non sequitur.
13Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 19. Sean Ingham notes some difficulties with avoiding
claims about which options are best in the context of epistemic arguments for democracy; Ingham,
“Disagreement and Epistemic Arguments for Democracy,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 12
(2013): 136–155.
14If there is a better argument available to epistocrats, we hope our critique provokes someone to
clarify what it is.
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First, let’s note that premise (1) is a statement about the causal effect of competence on an
individual’s probability of voting correctly. It does not say that someone who has measurable
competence is, all things considered, more likely to vote correctly; that is, it does not say that
measurable competence is correlated with a higher probability of voting correctly. That is what (2)
asserts, and it is, in essence, the conjecture in dispute. Premise (1) compares an actual probability
with a counterfactual probability—how much more (less) likely one would be to vote correctly if
one were (in)competent, holding all other relevant variables constant—while (2) compares actual
probabilities between two groups of voters, competent and incompetent.
Note also that premise (1) has a strong and a weak interpretation. On the strong interpretation,
(1) says that competence increases everyone’s probability of voting correctly—that the effect of
competence is always positive. On the weak interpretation, (1) says that the average effect of
competence is positive, which is consistent with saying that, for some people, competence makes
no difference to the probability of voting correctly—for those of ill-will or otherwise morally
corrupt character perhaps. Which interpretation is plausible will depend on which specific abilities
and forms of knowledge are used to fill out the definition of “measurable competence”. Since we
leave this further specification to epistocrats, we also leave it to them to decide which interpretation
of (1) they prefer. Our argument is consistent with either interpretation.
To see why the move from (1) to (2) is a non sequitur, consider an analogous inference:
(i) Statins reduce one’s risk of cardiovascular disease (on average, they reduce one’s risk).
(ii) Thus the average person taking statins is at lower risk of cardiovascular disease than the
average person not taking statins.
Statement (i) is about the causal effect of taking statins on one’s risk of cardiovascular disease,
while statement (ii) asserts a correlation between taking statins and a decreased risk of cardiovas-
cular disease. Like the move from (1) to (2), the move from (i) to (ii) infers a statement about a
correlation between two variables from a statement about the causal effect of one variable on the
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other. This inference is faulty because the average person who takes statins differs from the average
person who does not in numerous ways beyond their consumption of statins. The most important
difference is that the average person taking statins has a greater “baseline risk” of cardiovascular
disease—risk in the (counterfactual) scenario where they are not taking the medication—than the
average person who does not take statins. This is why people choose to take the medication in the
first place; people “self-select” into the treatment group on the basis of their baseline risk of dis-
ease. There is thus “bias” in the process of determining who ends up in which group. As a result,
the group of people who take statins can have a higher average risk of cardiovascular disease than
the group of people not taking statins even while each person who takes statins has a lower risk of
cardiovascular disease than they would have without the medication.
Just as selection bias blocks the move from (i) to (ii), so selection bias blocks epistocrats’ move
from (1) to (2). That move is unwarranted unless one can defend the further claim that there is no
significant selection bias in the process determining who ends up in the group of competent voters.
The question, then, is whether we have compelling reasons to accept or reject this claim.
Selection bias occurs when “confounders” influence both the probability of ending up in the
“treatment” group and, via other causal pathways not involving the treatment (“confounding path-
ways”), the outcome of interest. In our medical example, risk factors for cardiovascular disease
lead people to take statins but also (by a different causal path) raise the risk of cardiovascular dis-
ease. In the political context, potential confounders would be any variables that influence both the
probability of acquiring measurable competence and also, via other causal pathways not involving
competence, the probability of voting correctly (see figure 1). To take just one example, suppose
the measure of competence is knowledge of the candidates’ positions on various issues, and that
one is more likely to acquire this knowledge if one travels in more affluent social circles where
such knowledge is esteemed as a sign of sophistication or good citizenship. Plausibly, membership
in such affluent social networks affects various other attributes—e.g., cultural attitudes or ethical






Figure 1: A factor (F) increases the probability that a person will acquire competence (C), which
in turn affects voting behavior (V); F also increases the probability that a person will possess some
other attribute (A), which, depending on the attribute and the context, increases or decreases the
probability of voting correctly. F is thus a confounder and F→A→V is a confounding pathway. C
and A are systematically correlated, so that selecting for competence also indirectly selects for any
attributes (A) that are causally downstream of the confounder.
petence. There are many more plausible candidates for confounding variables, some of which we
discuss below. For any particular hypothesis about a source of selection bias, reasonable people
might disagree about how much credence to put in it, but there are no a priori reasons for rejecting
each and every one of these hypotheses.
Due to selection bias, then, the move from (1) to (2) is a non sequitur. Indeed, it is a non
sequitur for reasons that are familiar to advanced undergraduates or first-year graduate students in
the social sciences. It is a social scientific platitude that “correlation does not imply causation”, that
we cannot infer that one variable has a causal effect on another from the observation that the two
variables are correlated. Such an inference is faulty due to the threat of selection bias. Selection
bias implies that the converse is also true: “causation does not imply correlation”. Epistocrats’
move from (1) to (2) thus violates an elementary insight about causal inference.
For all we’ve said thus far, selection bias only blocks the move from (1) to (2); it doesn’t imply
that (2) is false. Since the Epistocratic Conjecture follows from (2) and (3) alone, epistocrats might
look for ways of vindicating (2) without deriving it (solely) from (1). Might premise (2) be true
despite the realistic threat of selection bias?
Epistocrats could add a premise that, together with (1), would imply (2).15 For instance, they
15Alternatively, epistocrats might be tempted to treat (2) as true by definition, simply defining
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could argue that any attributes correlated with competence do not (on average) decrease the proba-
bility of voting correctly or that any negative effect on the probability of voting correctly does not
outweigh the positive effect of competence. One finds versions of an argument along these lines in
existing discussions of the so-called “demographic objection”.16 These discussions consider the
possibility that demographic variables such as race or class might play the role of confounders,
with the confounding causal pathways involving some sort of bias or other moral or cognitive
shortcoming. If this is all the objection from selection bias amounts to, then it might seem a man-
ageable task to justify the additional premise: first, we identify the demographic variables that are
correlated with competence; then, for each of these variables, we show that the biases of the mem-
bers of each demographic group do not, on average, outweigh the positive effect of competence on
the probability of voting correctly. This is, in effect, Brennan’s reply to the demographic objection:
he first fixes on self-interested voting as the mechanism that is mostly likely to produce decisions
biased in favor of epistocratically-privileged demographic groups; he then argues that voters do
not—not on average, anyway—engage in self-interested voting.17 Thus, he concludes that any
biases we might find in an epistocratic electorate do not, on average, outweigh the positive effect
of competence on the probability of voting correctly.
The range of potential confounding pathways is much broader and much more difficult to
dismiss than those considered in the existing literature, however. Any argument meant to show
that (2) is true must rest on premises that are, at best, highly speculative and, at worst, deeply
implausible, depending on the context. To illustrate this point, we consider examples of two kinds
of confounders: those that generate systematic differences in people’s opportunities for acquiring
“competence” as that bundle of abilities and knowledge that is correlated with a higher probability
of voting correctly. We comment on this move in the conclusion.
16Brennan, “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?”; Estlund, Democratic
Authority; Mulligan, “On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason”.
17For example, Brennan, “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?”, p. 66.
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competence, and those that generate systematic differences in their motives to take advantage of
those opportunities. These examples clarify why the realistic threat of selection bias poses serious
difficulties for any argument for premise (2).
Opportunities for training. The first type of confounder consists of variables that affect one’s
opportunities for cultivating and training the abilities that constitute (part of) measurable compe-
tence. The demographic variables previous theorists have considered in the context of the demo-
graphic objection fall into this category. The conditions under which they will play the role of
confounders are more general than previously appreciated, however.
A university education is an example of an opportunity to cultivate certain cognitive abilities
and habits of mind that may improve one’s prospects of enfranchisement under an epistocratic suf-
frage rule. In many contexts, demographic variables like race and gender affect the probability that
a person will have these opportunities; so, too, can variables such as household income, the educa-
tional attainment of one’s parents, and one’s physical and mental health. These characteristics thus
affect one’s probability of acquiring measurable competence. But they also affect voting behavior
via pathways that do not involve competence acquisition; for example, by affecting how one per-
ceives the relationships between various policy issues and one’s well-being and sense of belonging,
or by affecting the composition of one’s social group and, in turn, a range of social influences on
one’s policy preferences (e.g., which sources of information one considers trustworthy).
To take one of Brennan’s suggestions, suppose the voter competence exam measures knowl-
edge of economics, assuming that knowledge of economics either causes one to be more likely to
vote correctly or is a proxy for knowledge that has this effect. Let’s suppose that a person with a
university degree will be more likely to have cultivated the abilities needed to pass the proposed
competence exam. Imagine that, owing to a history of racial hierarchy and oppression, members
of the dominant racial group are more likely to have opportunities to attend university and, hence,
more likely to acquire a university degree. Competence is thus correlated with race. Now sup-
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pose that in a given election, Party A is the “correct” option. Suppose further that Party B has a
checkered history of tolerating or encouraging racial division.
In previous discussions of the demographic objection, this story continues by positing that
membership in the privileged racial group leads to racial prejudice and thereby to sympathy for
the party that appeals to racial prejudice, thus reducing the probability of voting correctly. This
mechanism could produce the result that those who are measurably competent are less likely to
vote for the best option than those who lack measurable competence. Premise (2) fails to hold in
this case.
The familiar version of the story is only one possibility. To form a reasonable belief about
the plausibility of (2), given that race is correlated with competence, it is important to consider
alternative confounding pathways from race to voting behavior. For instance, in another plausible
version of the story, members of the minority racial group are “biased” against Party B, in the
sense that their suspicion toward Party B (even if it is entirely justified by the party’s history)
reduces the probability that they will vote for Party B, irrespective of which party is the best
option in the present circumstances. As a result, majority racial status is correlated with a lower
average probability of voting for Party A and, so, this mechanism could also produce the result
that those who are measurably competent are less likely to vote for the best option than those who
lack measurable competence. Premise (2) again fails to hold. Or consider a third continuation of
the story, in which racial status affects a person’s future occupation and social class and, in turn,
voting behavior. For example, members of the minority racial group may be more likely to work in
unionized workplaces and as a result become more sympathetic to Party A because of its historical
association with labor movements. This, too, could produce the result that measurably competent
citizens are less likely to vote for the best option. Yet again, premise (2) fails to hold.18
In the second and third versions of the story, majority racial status is a confounder that in-
18This last mechanism could be instantiated using different confounders; variables like household
income and parents’ educational attainment might play a role similar to that of race.
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creases the probability of acquiring measurable competence and reduces the probability of voting
for Party A, but not because it leads to self-interested or prejudicial voting on the part of those
who acquire measurable competence. The confounding pathway does not involve any moral or
cognitive shortcomings in those who acquire measurable competence. Instead, it explains why
those who are less likely to acquire measurable competence are more likely to be biased in favor
of the correct option.19 The confounder does not “robustly” reduce the probability of voting for
the correct option, whatever the correct option is. Instead, it reduces the probability of voting for
the correct option for contingent reasons unrelated to the reasons explaining why it is the correct
option.
This last observation might prompt the reply that, if it is only for contingent reasons that mea-
surable competence is associated with a reduced probability of voting correctly, then the example
does not illustrate a general reason for rejecting (2). But that conclusion is mistaken: the threat of
selection bias implies that, where measurable competence is correlated with an increased probabil-
ity of voting correctly (as premise (2) maintains), it is only contingently so. To see why, suppose it
is true of our example that competence is correlated with a higher probability of voting for Party A.
Since the previous paragraph shows that, plausibly, this might not have been so, the explanation for
this correlation must appeal to contingent facts about the joint distribution (within the population)
of various attributes—including competence—that are both causally downstream from race and
influence voting behavior. Generally speaking, then, our example illustrates that the truth of (2)
can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. Whether (2) is true depends on: (a) which vari-
ables systematically influence the distribution of opportunities for acquiring competence (race is
19Other confounding pathways from race to voting behavior emerge once we recognize that
university graduates can systematically differ from non-graduates in myriad ways beyond average
competence; for example, they might have higher average incomes or be more likely to favor left-
leaning social policies (perhaps, as conservatives are wont to point out, due to the widespread
“liberal” socialization that occurs on university campuses).
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only one example); (b) which attributes are causally downstream of those opportunity-influencing
variables; and (c) the direction and magnitude of the effect of these attributes on the probability of
voting for the correct option across the set of determinate choices an electorate is likely to face.
Epistocrats have provided no compelling theoretical reasons to expect that this mass of contingent
facts will tend to align so that premise (2) holds more often than not; nor have they presented
arguments to ground a theoretical expectation about the contingent conditions under which (2) is
likely to be true. And, absent controversial assumptions about which options are best across a
sufficiently broad range of determinate choices, they cannot provide empirical evidence that these
contingent facts support (2). Thus, reflecting on the reasons to expect selection bias, it is clear we
have no reason to accept (2) as a general truth. Without that premise, we have no reason to accept
the Epistocratic Conjecture.
Motives to acquire competence. The previous examples focus on systematic differences in
opportunities for acquiring competence as a source of selection bias. We now focus on systematic
differences in motivation to acquire competence, a source of selection bias that would plausibly
be present even in hypothetical societies where everyone has the same opportunities for acquiring
competence.
To take another of Brennan’s examples, suppose that the competence exam measures, not
knowledge of an academic field such as economics, but basic knowledge about the candidates
and their positions. Almost all citizens in established democracies now have abundant opportu-
nities to acquire this kind of basic information but few choose to become well-informed. From a
familiar point of view, what requires explanation is not why so many citizens are ignorant of these
matters, but rather why a select few choose to spend time and energy acquiring such information.
The probability of casting a vote that changes the election outcome is effectively zero, so the con-
sequences of casting an ill-informed vote provide little motivation to become informed. What is
perhaps surprising, then, is that some people nonetheless become well-informed.
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Critics who emphasize the problem of voter ignorance (e.g., Brennan, Caplan, Somin) are fa-
miliar with this observation, which is rhetorically useful when the goal is to explain why we should
view the typical democratic citizen’s ignorance as more or less inevitable—a product of incentives
that would be present in any realistic democracy—rather than a remediable and contingent defect
of actually existing democracies. But these critics neglect its implications when discussing the
demographic objection to epistocracy.
Suppose (plausibly enough) that some citizens have ideological or partisan motivations for
acquiring information. They may find it gratifying to acquire information that confirms their an-
tecedently held political opinions, or they may reap social benefits from being able to publicly
marshal “evidence” in support of their antecedently held opinions. For convenience, call citizens
of this type ideological voters.20 And suppose, for simplicity, that most other citizens are apa-
thetic voters: they have no entrenched partisan allegiance or firmly held political opinions that
are integral to their sense of self and identity but, for this reason, they also lack the ideological
voter’s instrumental reasons for becoming well-informed. Information will not flatter their sense
of superiority or confirm their sense of self, nor do they need to arm themselves with information
for partisan combat, which they have no desire to engage. Without prejudices standing in the way,
information might make a difference to these voters’ political opinions; but lacking ideological
prejudices they feel the need to rationalize for personal or social reasons, they have no incen-
tives to acquire information.21 When the population consists largely of these two types, requiring
citizens to pass a test measuring knowledge of the parties and their positions will be an indirect
means of selecting for ideological voters. As a result, epistocratic voters will be more likely to be
ideological voters than democratic voters.
In this scenario, ideological motivation is a confounder—it influences both the probability a
voter acquires measurable competence and, via causal pathways not involving competence, the
20Compare with Brennan’s political “hooligan” in Against Democracy, p. 5.
21Compare with Brennan’s description of “hobbits” in Against Democracy, p. 4.
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probability of voting correctly. To fix ideas about a plausible confounding pathway, let’s assume
ideological motivation increases the probability of consuming information in an ideologically bi-
ased manner. If biased information consumption has a negative causal effect on the probability of
voting correctly and the size of this effect is large enough, then, because measurable competence
is (by hypothesis) correlated with biased information consumption, measurably competent voters
can be less likely to vote correctly than apathetic voters, and premise (2) will be false.
Ideological motivation could be a confounder in either of two ways, “robustly” or “contin-
gently.” Regarding the former, we might plausibly imagine that everyone has some basic ability to
“track” facts about which options are best—in the sense that such facts affect their beliefs about
which option is best—but that biased information consumption interferes with this ability, making
the ideological voters worse truth-trackers than the apathetic voters. This would make ideological
motivation a “robust” confounder: by increasing the probability of biased information consump-
tion, it reduces the probability of voting correctly whatever the correct option is, even while it
increases the probability of acquiring the kind of competence that the exam measures (information
about the candidates and their policies).
To see how ideological motivation can be a contingent confounder, suppose apathetic and ide-
ological voters are equally bad at tracking facts about which options are best. For simplicity, let’s
assume the extreme case in which no one is doing any tracking—facts about which options are best
are causally inert. Yet, for contingent reasons, apathetic voters (in the baseline scenario where they
lack information) tend to support Party A, which happens to be the better option for unrelated rea-
sons, while ideological voters (in the baseline scenario) are by comparison more likely to support
Party B. Why might this kind of scenario be plausible? One explanation is that Party B could be
more successful at inflaming the ideological passions of its supporters such that ideological think-
ing (via its positive effect on biased information consumption) correlates with voting for Party B.
In such a scenario, ideological thinking is a contingent confounder, but a confounder all the same.
Due to selection bias, then, those voters who acquire measurable competence can be less likely to
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vote correctly than those who lack it.
Ideological motivation is just one source of systematic differences in individuals’ eagerness to
acquire information. We can easily imagine others. There is evidence that some of the “Big Five”
personality traits, such as conscientiousness, influence years of schooling, grades, and scores on
tests of cognitive ability,22 and it would not be surprising if they also turned out to influence (either
directly or through their effects on educational outcomes) success on a test of political competence.
An independent literature in political science argues that these traits influence political attitudes as
well; for example, one finding is that conscientiousness is associated with conservatism, at least
in certain political contexts.23 This suggests another possible source of selection bias that an ar-
gument for the epistocratic conjecture would have to rule out: namely, the possibility that certain
personality traits both increase the probability of acquiring measurable competence and, by other
causal pathways, predispose people to ideological orientations that, perhaps only contingently if
not robustly, reduce the probability of voting correctly. Yet another possibility, to which we alluded
above, is that some people have social incentives to acquire information—a desire “to belong to
and be respected by some group” whose members value knowledge about politics.24 Those in-
centives may also be associated, in complicated ways, with class, education, or other demographic
variables. These latter variables may not robustly reduce the probability of voting correctly, but
they may influence voting behavior, and, for the reasons enumerated above, that possibility suffices
to undermine our confidence that premise (2) is generally true, or even true in a wide enough range
22For an overview of the literature, see Mathilde Almlund, Angela Lee Duckworth, James Heck-
man, and Tim Kautz. “Personality Psychology and Economics.” In Handbook of the Economics of
Education, volume 4 (Elsevier, 2011), pp. 1–181.
23Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Shang E. Ha,
“Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts,”
American Political Science Review 104(1) (2010): 111–133.
24Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 35.
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of contingent conditions to warrant support for epistocratic suffrage rules.
4 Selection bias and the demographic objection
As we have developed it, the objection from selection bias generalizes and subsumes the “demo-
graphic objection” to epistocracy discussed in previous literature.25 But these previous discussions
obscure both the scope and the force of the objection.
Regarding the scope of the objection, our examples in the previous section show that the range
of realistic scenarios in which epistocratic suffrage rules are vulnerable to selection bias is con-
siderably broader than extant discussions of the demographic objection have appreciated. In par-
ticular, our examples show that the range of confounding variables is not limited to observable
demographic attributes but also includes unobservable (or hard-to-observe) attributes such as ide-
ological motivation or a desire to “fit in” with certain social groups. Additionally, our examples
show that the range of plausible confounding pathways is not limited to the activation of certain
moral or cognitive shortcomings such as racial prejudice or self-interest.26 Extant discussions of
the demographic objection have obscured the scope of the objection because they have neglected
to reflect on the reasons why some people acquire the information or skills that a competence exam
would measure. But there is no way to form a reasonable opinion about the plausibility of premise
(2) and, in turn, the Epistocratic Conjecture without first engaging in that reflection. The distribu-
tion of competence within a population cannot be taken as given but is something to be explained.
Once we survey plausible explanations for the distribution of competence, we realize that many of
the variables that influence the distribution of competence also influence the distribution of other
25Brennan, “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?”; Estlund, Democratic
Authority; Mulligan, “On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason”.
26Cf. Brennan, “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?”; Estlund, Demo-
cratic Authority.
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variables that, in turn, affect voting behavior. Faced with this realization, the only reasonable belief
is that epistocratic suffrage rules are vulnerable to selection bias in a way that makes the truth of
premise (2) highly contingent on the joint distribution of all these variables within a population.
Epistocrats have given us no reason to believe otherwise.
Previous discussions also obscure the force of the objection from selection bias. For example,
Brennan reconstructs the demographic objection as implying the strong claim that epistocratic de-
cision procedures will produce worse results than democratic decision procedures.27 Yet, properly
understood, the objection from selection bias implies no such thing. The point is, instead, that we
have no reason to accept premise (2) as a general truth. The upshot is that we have no reason to
accept the Epistocratic Conjecture. Since arguments for epistocratic suffrage rules rest entirely on
the Epistocratic Conjecture, the objection from selection bias implies that we have no reason to
expect that epistocratic suffrage rules are likely to produce better results than universal suffrage.
This weaker claim—namely, that we have no reason to accept the Epistocratic Conjecture—
is enough to put to rest serious discussion of epistocratic suffrage rules as a practical proposal.
The reasons to entertain such rules are only as good as the reasons for expecting that they would
produce better decisions than universal suffrage. There are no other serious claims to be made on
their behalf. Allocating political power according to measures of competence is not intrinsically
desirable. If there are in fact no reasons to expect the typical epistocratic voter to be more reliable
than the typical democratic voter, then epistocratic suffrage rules do not merit serious practical
27“Does the Demographic Objection Epistocracy Succeed?”, p. 63. More precisely, Brennan
calls this the “bad results” version of the demographic objection. He also presents an “unfair-
ness” version, according to which it is unfair to exclude members of some demographic groups
from political power. We ignore this version because it represents an idiosyncratic understanding
of the demographic objection by setting aside concerns about the decision-making consequences
of competence being correlated with certain demographic variables, which are central to typical
statements of the demographic objection.
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consideration.
Whereas Brennan overstates the upshot of the threat of selection bias, Estlund understates it.
As Estlund states it, the demographic objection (which he lodges against Mill’s scheme for plural
voting) is a version of the objection from selection bias, focusing specifically on the potential
association of education with “epistemically damaging” features.28 In his initial statement, Estlund
posits certain demographic variables such as race and class as potential confounders, which explain
the association of education with characteristics (e.g., racial or class bias) that damage a voter’s
epistemic quality. After considering the possibility that voting weights might be adjusted so as
to correct for the underrepresentation of socially disadvantaged groups among the educated, he
considers a revised version of the objection, which posits “latent” and “conjectural” characteristics
that might be correlated with education but damage a voter’s epistemic quality. As Estlund sees
it, the demographic objection ultimately rests on the possibility that “there may remain important
sample errors [i.e., selection bias] of which we are unaware” even if a plural voting scheme restricts
the allocation of extra votes to a demographically representative sample of educated citizens. What
are we to make of this concern? While Estlund refrains from endorsing the objection on its merits,
he concedes that the concern is “not crazy” and therefore surmises it may be reasonable enough to
defeat the claim that an “epistocracy of the educated” is legitimate.29
By contrast, we do not hold that the objection from selection bias is one that a reasonable
person might endorse, while remaining ourselves agnostic. We endorse it without reservation, as
ought the reader. Estlund’s equivocal stance on the force of the demographic objection is at least
partly explained by the fact that he introduces it to support the claim that the average epistocratic
voter is less likely to vote correctly than the average democratic voter. But this claim is logically
stronger than the claim that the objection from selection bias can support: namely, that we have no
reasons to believe that the average epistocratic voter will be more likely to vote correctly than the
28Democratic Authority, pp. 215–19.
29Ibid., p. 218.
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average democratic voter.30 Since this skeptical claim clearly follows from the fact that epistocratic
suffrage rules are vulnerable to selection bias, we have no reason to hedge our endorsement of the
objection.
5 Institutional patches to epistocracy
Brennan acknowledges that competence, by whatever operative measure, will be correlated with
various demographic variables.31 One of his responses is to propose versions of epistocracy that
are allegedly not susceptible to the demographic objection. One involves the use of an enfran-
chisement lottery, first introduced by López-Guerra; the other is what Brennan calls Government
by Simulated Oracle.32
Government by Simulated Oracle institutionalizes a simulation of the electorate’s counterfac-
tual “enlightened” preferences:
We can administer surveys that track citizens’ political preferences and demographic
characteristics, while testing their basic objective political knowledge. Once we have
this information, we can simulate what would happen if the electorate’s demograph-
ics remained unchanged, but all citizens were able to get perfect scores on tests of
objective political knowledge.33
This proposal avoids the objection from selection bias only if all potential confounders that influ-
ence both voting behavior and competence acquisition are observable. But demographic variables
30Because the objection from selection bias implies this weaker claim, it does not invite Mulli-
gan’s response to Estlund’s use of the demographic objection (“On the compatibility of epistocracy
and public reason”).
31Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 228.
32See also Malcolm, “Epistocracy and Public Interests”.
33Brennan, Against Democracy, p. 221.
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like race, class, gender, and so on are not the only sources of selection bias, as we’ve already
shown. If there are unobserved factors that affect both voting behavior and competence acquisi-
tion, then the probability that the average (hypothetical) member of this simulated electorate votes
correctly can be lower than the average (actual) democratic voter’s probability of voting correctly.
One cannot form a reasonable opinion about the Simulated Oracle without first considering
the following question: among a group of people who are all alike with respect to the observable
demographic variables that this method controls for, what explains why some of them get perfect
scores on the tests of political knowledge while others do not? The answer to that question points
one toward the possible confounders or reassures one that there are none. Of the variables impli-
cated in the answer, one must then ask whether they might also influence voting behavior by other
causal pathways. A moment’s reflection suggests various possibilities. Perhaps the explanation
is that some people are more ambitious, intelligent, or resourceful, all qualities that affect career
prospects, income, and other links in causal chains that eventually terminate in voting behavior.
Perhaps the answer is that some people enjoy accumulating knowledge that confirms their prej-
udices, or equips them to engage skillfully in public argument, to continue with the story above
about differential incentives for acquiring information. Perhaps core personality traits influence
both the desire for information and, via other causal pathways, one’s political opinions. Any of
these possibilities are cause to doubt whether the average (hypothetical) member of the simulated
electorate is more likely to vote correctly than the average (actual) democratic voter
Over the last two decades social science has placed increasing emphasis on the importance
of research designs and strategies for credibly identifying causal effects.34 In no small part, this
34Joshua Angrist and Jörn Pischke, “The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How
Better Research Design is Taking the Con out of Econometrics” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 24 (2010): 3–30; Stephen Morgan and Christopher Winship, Counterfactuals and Causal
Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research, second edition (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2014); Cyrus Samii, “Causal Empiricism in Quantitative Research,” The Journal
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is because social scientists are increasingly skeptical of the possibility of observing and measur-
ing all the potential confounders in the typical settings that interest social scientists—such as the
effects of political knowledge on voting behavior. Since it cannot account for unobserved (or un-
observable) confounders, the Simulated Oracle proposal cannot avoid such skepticism. Defenders
of epistocracy should be worried if their core conjecture, the basis for a proposed radical transfor-
mation of existing political institutions, is plausible only under assumptions that would struggle to
get through peer review at credible social science journals.
Turning now to a second proposal, López-Guerra proposes an “enfranchisement lottery,” which
Brennan cites approvingly as a version of epistocracy that is immune to the demographic objection.
López-Guerra leaves his proposal deliberately indeterminate in its institutional details, offering it
as a challenge to certain democratic prejudices and asking his reader to entertain whichever version
of the schematic proposal the reader considers most compelling. There are ways of filling in the
details so that the proposal does not invite the objection from selection bias, although some people
might question whether the resulting implementation really counts as an epistocracy, as opposed
to the kind of lottery-based interpretation of democracy that many self-described democrats now
defend. Brennan, however, fills in a critical detail that results in an implementation naturally
viewed as a form of epistocracy, but also one that is vulnerable to the objection from selection
bias.
The first step of the lottery, taken prior to each election, is to select a random sample of the
population who alone are eligible to acquire the right to vote. Everyone else is disenfranchised. The
members of the random sample—the “pre-voters”—are then invited to participate in a competence-
building exercise. If they choose to participate, then they become enfranchised.35 However, as
Brennan reconstructs the proposal, the “pre-voters may then earn the right to vote, but only if they
of Politics 78 (2016): 941–955.
35López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement, chap. 2.
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first participate in and pass certain competence-building exercises.”36 The key difference is that
Brennan assumes that, to qualify to vote, pre-voters must pass some test of competence, to be
administered after the competence-building exercise. To our knowledge, that assumption is absent
from López-Guerra’s presentation of the idea.
Brennan’s addition of the competence test makes all the difference as far as the objection from
selection bias is concerned. Assuming the size of the random sample is large enough, that all
randomly selected pre-voters choose to participate in the competence-building exercise, and that
the average effect of the competence-building exercise is to increase the probability of voting
correctly—assuming, in other words, that it merits the name “competence-building exercise”—
then the probability that the typical pre-voter votes correctly can only be higher than the probability
that the typical democratic voter votes correctly. (The second assumption would of course be un-
justified if participation were voluntary and uncompensated, but seems reasonable if participation
is either compulsory or monetary compensation is sufficiently generous.) There is in this case no
bias in who is selected, nor in who is ultimately enfranchised; everyone is equally likely to become
enfranchised, and the average voter under this system is indistinguishable, except for their higher
level of competence, from the average voter under universal suffrage.
With Brennan’s version of the proposal, however, pre-voters who fail a competence test are
disenfranchised, so we must ask whether there might be confounders that raise the probability of
passing the test and also affect voting behavior by other pathways. It is, again, not hard to think
of plausible candidates. Perhaps pre-voters from certain professions or class backgrounds will
have an easier time with the test even after everyone undergoes the same competence-building
exercise, but will also be biased against voting for the best option by the prejudices characteristic
of those social backgrounds. Perhaps partisans and ideologues will be more strongly motivated to
learn whatever information is needed to pass the competence-building exercise, because they are
more concerned with social status and signaling their political sophistication and moral superiority,
36“Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?”, p. 55, emphasis in original.
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and public validation of being well-informed helps in this regard. And perhaps the agencies that
organize the competence-building exercise are not paragons of dispassionate, apolitical neutrality,
but instead flesh-and-blood human beings whose own biases creep into the informational briefing
materials and the exam, such that pre-voters who share their orientation are both more likely to
pass the exam and less likely to vote for the best alternative. Whatever the case may be, Brennan’s
amendment to López-Guerra’s proposal makes it vulnerable to the objection from selection bias.
6 Conclusion
Recall the crucial premises in our reconstruction of the argument for the Epistocratic Conjecture:
(1) Being measurably competent increases a person’s probability of voting correctly.
(2) Thus measurably competent citizens are more likely to vote correctly than measurably in-
competent citizens.
We have shown that the threat of selection bias implies both that the move from (1) to (2) is faulty
and that the truth of (2) fundamentally depends on contingent facts about the joint distribution of
countless variables that influence voting behavior. The threat of selection bias therefore implies
that we have no reason to accept that (2) holds across a wide range of circumstances and, so,
no reason to accept epistocrats’ conjecture that epistocratic voters are on average more likely to
vote correctly than democratic voters. We are thus left without any reason to seriously entertain
epistocracy as a practical proposal.
One potential concern is that our objection goes too far, undermining any argument for del-
egating decision-making to people with special knowledge in any context. Yet surely decisions
to approve new medications should be left to panels of medical scientists, choices among design
options for new public works should be left to panels of engineers, and so on.37 Does the objection
37One may also wonder whether our argument is compatible with Dimitri Landa and Ryan
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from selection bias, absurdly, target arguments for these common-sense views?
A decision-making procedure is susceptible to selection bias when two conditions obtain:
(a) competence is not distributed as good as randomly within a population, so that competence is
systematically correlated with other attributes; (b) these latter attributes plausibly affect a person’s
decision in a way that counteracts or neutralizes the positive effect of competence on decision-
making. Putting our point in this way allows us to identify two restrictions on the scope of the
objection from selection bias: since (a) and (b) are both necessary, the objection fails to apply if
either (a) or (b) fails to obtain. If (a) fails to obtain, then competent individuals will be a represen-
tative sample of the population with respect to all attributes except competence. Our discussion
of López-Guerra’s “enfranchisement lottery” illustrates how a decision-making procedure avoids
the objection from selection bias if (a) fails to obtain. Short of a situation in which competence
is distributed as good as randomly, we must speculate about, or measure empirically, the strength
of its correlation with other attributes affecting the probability of deciding correctly as well as
Pevnick’s “epistocratic” justification of representative democracy, which appeals to the claim that
elected officials, because their actions are more likely to be pivotal and they are held accountable
for them, have stronger incentives to acquire relevant competence than ordinary citizens (“Repre-
sentative Democracy as Defensible Epistocracy,” American Political Science Review 114 (2020):
1–13). Provided elections select for individuals who are “at baseline” at least as likely to support
good policies as ordinary citizens, or more likely to do so, their claim about elected officials’ incen-
tives could justify the conclusion that they are more likely to support good policies than ordinary
citizens without inviting the objection from selection bias. It would be analogous in its logic to the
following claim: if one recruits people who are at least as healthy as the average member of the
general population into a study in which they are provided with incentives to do something that, by
assumption, has the effect of making one healthier, then they will end up healthier than the average
member of the general population. What is called condition (b) in the next paragraph would fail to
hold in this case.
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the magnitude of their effects. Where the case for delegating decision-making authority to people
with technical expertise is uncontroversial, it is because there are good grounds for believing this
correlation to be weak or these effects to be minimal or benign.
Consider, for example, the technical engineering knowledge needed to evaluate two proposed
designs for a new bridge—knowledge that, by assumption, has a positive effect on the probability
of selecting the better of the two designs. This knowledge will not be distributed as good as
randomly in the population, but it may be that none of the attributes with which it correlates (race,
gender, class, etc.) affects the probability that a person would select the better of the two proposals.
This case can be represented by a slightly modified version of figure 1, in which the arrow from
A to V is absent. In this case, the objection from selection bias has no bite because competence
is the only variable that affects decision-making, and it improves decision-making by assumption.
Or it might correlate with an attribute, like conscientiousness, which itself has a positive effect on
the probability of selecting the best bridge design. Again, the objection from selection bias has no
bite. Finally, it could correlate with an attribute that negatively affects the probability of selecting
the best proposal. For example, perhaps among the pool of individuals who could be selected to
review and decide on the proposals, technical engineering expertise correlates with having some
kind of conflict of interest. Where we can control for any such mitigating factors, we rightly take
steps to do so—for example, by requiring experts to declare any potential conflicts of interest or
excluding those with such conflicts from the selection panel. Where we have reason to believe that
we cannot control for mitigating factors, we rightly worry that they might undercut the beneficial
effects of expertise.
Politics is importantly different from engineering. When it comes to political decisions, various
attributes of a person, beyond just competence and the presence or absence of conflicts of interest,
may affect the probability of voting for the best option and, thus, create reasonable doubt that more
competent voters would make better decisions. If measurable competence correlates with these
attributes, then whether it is best to leave decision-making to competent individuals turns on the
29
strength of this correlation and the magnitude of these attributes’ effects relative to the positive
effect of competence.
At this point, epistocracy’s sympathizers might be tempted to define “competence” so that it
is just true by definition that more competent voters are more likely to vote correctly. That is,
they might reply that epistocratic suffrage rules should be defined as enfranchising all and only
those citizens who are most likely to vote correctly. A minor objection is that the resulting scheme
would not merit the name “epistocracy” because, as the examples above indicate, the attributes in
virtue of which some voters are more likely to vote correctly, in a particular context, need not be
knowledge or anything naturally described as an ability. For instance, being biased in favor of a
party which, for unrelated reasons, is the best option is not an ability.
A more important problem is that, as we suggested at the outset, this move turns epistocracy
into an aspiration rather than a concrete institutional proposal. A concrete proposal requires spec-
ifying an observable outcome, such as performance on a certain kind of test or possession of a
university degree, as the basis for suffrage. One can identify observable outcomes which, plausi-
bly enough, indicate possession of certain abilities or knowledge that can only serve to increase
the probability of voting correctly. But for any such observable outcome, it will always be an open
question whether the citizens enfranchised on its basis are on average more likely to vote correctly
than those disenfranchised. What is relatively uncontroversial is that certain abilities and forms of
knowledge influence the probability of voting correctly—claims, like (1), which posit causal ef-
fects. For epistocrats to make such claims without argument and without evidence is fair enough;
they seem like as good a starting point as any. What is a matter of controversial speculation is
whether citizens who have these abilities and forms of knowledge are on average more likely to
vote correctly—claims, like (2), which posit correlation between measurable competence and vot-
ing for the best option. One can either define epistocratic suffrage rules in terms of claims like
(1), in which case a concrete institutional rule is being proposed and we can readily imagine how
to implement it, but the specter of selection bias makes it an open question whether the average
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epistocratic voter would be more likely to vote correctly than the average democratic voter. Or one
can define epistocratic suffrage rules in terms of claims like (2), in which case it is trivially true
that the average epistocratic voter would be more likely to vote correctly, but it is an open question
whether there are any feasible rules that realize what is now just an aspiration. Gerrymandering
one’s definitions will not circumvent the basic problem that there is no way to determine who is
most likely to vote correctly absent controversial assumptions about which options are the correct
ones.
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